I specialize in studying evolutionary game theory, particulary in relation to the convergence of societies to conventions and traditions. My work overlaps economics, mathematics, evolutionary anthropology and philosophy. A particular focus of my research is on collaboration. How did collaboration, as in joint decision making, evolve and where can we expect to find it? What effect does collaboration have on the conventions and norms that are established in society?
Papers
Risk Attitudes and Risk Dominance in the Long Run
Heinrich H. Nax; Jonathan Newton
Games and Economic Behavior, May 2019, Peer-reviewed
Agency Equilibrium
Jonathan Newton
Games, Mar. 2019, Peer-reviewed
Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry
Sung-Ha Hwang; Wooyoung Lim; Philip Neary; Jonathan Newton
Games and Economic Behavior, 01 Jul. 2018, Peer-reviewed
Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance
Games, May 2018, Peer-reviewed
Heterogeneity in preferences and behavior in threshold models
Philip R. Neary; Jonathan Newton
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Dec. 2017, Peer-reviewed
Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
Sung-Ha Hwang; Jonathan Newton
ECONOMIC THEORY, Oct. 2017, Peer-reviewed
Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration
Jonathan Newton
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, Jul. 2017, Peer-reviewed
The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity
Jonathan Newton
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, May 2017, Peer-reviewed
Stochastic stability in assignment problems
Bettina Klaus; Jonathan Newton
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, Jan. 2016, Peer-reviewed
Emergence of Shared Intentionality Is Coupled to the Advance of Cumulative Culture