Dynamic Game Theory and Its Application to Economics
Overview of the research
My research is about theoretical study of dynamic games and, in particular, repeated games, with an emphasis on imperfect monitoring models where each player receives only noisy information about the other players' actions. So far, I have shown (i) the first efficiency result for imperfect private monitoring models where each player receives noisy and private information about the other players' actions, (ii) a general efficiency result/folk theorem for costly monitoring models where precise information is available at costs, and (iii) new equilibrium constructions for optional monitoring models where the monitoring cost is zero, on the basis of strategic possibilities brought about by not exercising the monitoring options.
Research Interests
契約の理論
ゲーム理論
ミクロ経済学
Contract Theory
Game Theory
Microeconomics
Research Areas
Humanities & social sciences, Theoretical economics